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the judgment been in favor of any one other than the state, it is con-
ceded the property would not have been liable to be sold. But it is
contended that the state is not bound by the statutory exemptions con-
cerning homesteads.
The general rule in the construction of statutes is to interpret them
so as not to embrace the sovereign power of the state, or affect her rights,
unless she be specially named, or it be clear by necessary implication
that she was intended to be included.
The legislature, in the provision of the law respecting homesteads,
uses the broadest language and exempts from attachment and execution
the homestead in all cases, except as therein provided : Wag. St. 691,
§ 1. The exceptions extend to certain specified cases, but no reserva-
tion is anywhere made in favor of the state.
As illustrative of the intention of the law-making powers, light may
be thrown on the subject by reference to analogous legislation. In the
chapter on executions (1 Wag. St. 603, § 9), it is declared that certain
enumerated personal property shall be exempt from attachment and
execution, but the state is not named in the act as being bound by the
exemption. Still the legislature considered the state as being included
the same as an individual, for we find that in section 15 it is declared
that nothing contained in the chapter shall be construed so as to exempt
any property from seizure and sale for the payment of taxes due the
state, or any city or county thereof, showing clearly that it was the inten-
tion to include the state, and that the property may be seized by the state
only in the specified instance provided for in the 15th section. The
language employed in making the exemption is the same in both the
execution and homestead acts.
The acts are in kindred subjects--in par'i'materia-and may be con-
strued together. They have a common object in view. In the one case
it is to allow the family for their comfort and support to keep certain
necessary articles of which they cannot be deprived; in the other, to
have a secure and permanent home, free from the attacks of all creditors.
From the language used in the enactment, and the history of our legis-
lation-on the subject, I think the state is included by implication, and
that she does not stand in an attitude different from any other creditor.
The judgment must therefore be affirmed.
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B. his stock of goods, consisting in part of spirituous liquors, and took
the note of A. for the price. A. afterwards sold his interest in the stock
to B., and the plaintiff thereupon gave up A.'s note and took the note of
B for the amount. This note was afterwards surrendered, and the note
in suit, signed by B., with a surety, taken in its place. Held, that the
surrender of A.'s note furnished no sufficient consideration for the note
or B. ; and that the note sued must fiil for want of consideration; also,
that the plaintiff could not apply money paid generally upon the notes
to extinguish that part resting upon an illegal consideration so as to
leave the balance good: Gammon v. Plaisted, 51 N. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Statutes.
CORPORATION.
Equity Pleadizg-idtifarioutsness-Rigkt of Stockholders in a
TuVa nfacturhzg Company to invoke the aid of a Court of Equity to
compel the Payment of unpaid Subscrfptions.-The objection of inultif,-
riousness to a bill in equity, must be confined to cases where the demand
against each particular defendant is entirely distinct and separate in the
subject-matter from that in which other defendants are interested, and
does not apply where there is a common liability in the defendants, and
a common, although not a co-extensive, interest in the complainants:
Fiery v. Emmert, 36 Md.
A bill was filed in equity by shareholders in a manufacturing com-
pany, incorporated under the general incorporation law, against other
shareholders, for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of capital sub-
scribed, by whom subscribed, the amounts paid thereon, by whom paid,
and to enforce the payment of the same; to ascertain the debts of the
company, for the payment of which the stockholders were liable, under
the act of incorporation, to the amount of capital stock subscribed by
them respectively, and on account of which suits had already been insti-
tuted against the complainants, and to compel a ratable contribution by
all the stockholders towards the payment of the same. On a general
demurrer to the bill, it was held: 1st. That in regard to the several
matters charged in the bill, the complainants and defendants had a comn-
mon interest and a common liability, to the'extent of their individual
subscriptions, and the bill therefore was not multifarious; 2d. That the
bill having alleged that the entire amount of the capital stock of the
company was not subscribed, it ought to have charged that the several
stockholders, defendants, had, by their participation in the organization
of the company, or by other acts, waived their right to rely upon
such partial subscription of the capital stock as a defence to their lia-
bility, and the failure to so charge was a fatal defect in the bill; 3d.
That the corporation ought also to have been made a party to the
suit: Id.
DE13TOR AND CREDITOR. See Homestead.
Order to pay to third Person.-A written order by a creditor upon his
debtor, requesting him to pay to a third person, is an equitable assign-
ment of a chose in action, which a court of law (the debtor having
received notice of the assignment), will recognise and enforce : Conway
v. Cutfing, 51 N. H.
No particular form of words is essential to the validity of such an as-
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signment; neither is the express assent of the debtor thereto required
in order to establish his liability to pay the debt to the assignee: Id.
EQUITY. See Corporation; Homestead; Vendor and Purchaser.
ESTOPPEL.
'itle-Euity.-When a party assists another in the sale of property.
the legal title to which is in the seller, and recommends the title as
being good in the vendor, such party thus assisting the sale will not be
permitted to set up a secret equitable title in himself against such pur-
chaser thus induced to buy and pay for the property: Winchell v. Ed-
wards, 57 Ills.
.ThIDENCE.
Destruction of by Parties.-Where a party is proved to have sup-
pressed any species of evidence, or to have destroyed or defaced any
written instrument, a presumption arises that had the truth appeared it
would have been against his interest, and the fabrication of evidence
raises a presumption against the party doing so, no less than when evi-
dence has been suppressed or withheld: Winchell v. Edwards, 57 Ills.
Exbverts.-In an action for loss claimed to be covered by a policy of in-
surance the opinion of a witness not an expert, as to the value of a stock
of goods in a store, is not admissible; and whether he is an expert or
not is a question of fact for the judge who tries the cause, and not sub-
ject to revision: Taylor v. Ins. Co., 51 N. H.
Written Instruments-Attesting Witnesses.-Where one who has signed
his name as an attesting witness to the execution of an instrument did
so without the knowledge or consent of the parties, the instrument may
be proved as if there were no subscribing witness : Sherwood v. Pratt,
63 Barb.
The signature of a subscribing witness is not conclusive upon the
parties to the instrument. It is only prinim facie evidence that the
witness was called in by them; and the presumption arising from it may
be contradicted : Id.
And for that purpose, parol testimony may be received; the object
of the proof not being to contradict or vary the written agreement, but
merely to show that its execution was not attested in a particular way: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Sale.
IGHWAY.
Responsibility of County Commissioners for Injuries arising from the
Condition of the Public Roads.-Where, in consequence of the condi-
tion of the public roads of a county, a wagon and carriage are injured,
the owner thereof is entitled to recover from the county commissioners
damages for such injury, provided he used due care and caution whilst
travelling over the roads: County Commissioners v. Gibson, 36 Md.
The right of action against the county commissioners for injuries re.
sulting from the condition of the public roads, is not taken away by the
8th section of the Act of 1868, ch. 299, which permits the bond of a
road supervisor, given for the faithful performance of his duties, to be
put in suit for the benefit of any person who may suffer by the neglect
of such supervisor to keep the roads in his district in proper order: Id.
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HOMESTEAD.
Defin ition-Head of a Fam ily.-The family homestead is the residence
or dwelling-place of a family: Barn e1 v. Leeds, 51 N. H.
A widower, having a minor child residing with him and supported by
hiin, at his own dwelling-place, is the "head of a faimily," within the
meaning of the Homestead Act of 1851, and as such is secured by the
law of 1851 in the possession, enjoyment of, and entitled to a homestead
right to the extent of five hundred dollars in value, exempt froin attach.
ment aud levy or sale on execution: Id.
This right thus acquired is not lost or destroyed by the arrival of his
only child at years of majority., and the removal of the child frmn the
homestead, the father still continuing to occupy the premises as his own
dwelling-place and home: Id.
A debtor's right of homestead is not lost nor waived by the debtor's
neglect to make application to an officer levying an execution upon his
lands, to have such homestead set off to him, as provided by § 3 of the
Homestead Act [of 1851]: Id.
An execution may properly be extended upon real estate in which a
right of homestead exists, subject to such right of the debtor, in case
the debtor (or his wife, if the debtor has a faamily) does not make appli-
cation to the officer executing the writ to have a homestead set off tc
him in severalty: Id.
A creditor, causing the real estate of a debtor to be set off on execu-
tion, subject to a family homestead, is estopped to deny the validity of
the debtor's then existing homestead right : Md.
The right of homestead, before the same has been set off and assigned,
is not such an estate or interest in the land wherein it exists as will bar
a writ of entry therefor by a creditor who has levied an execution
thereon, subject to the debtor's homestead right: Pd.
Where a creditor causes the estate of his debtor, of greater value than
the homestead right of the latter therein, to be set off on execution.
subject to such homestead right, the creditor and the debtor, after the
levy of the creditor's execution, and before any proceedings by either
for a separation and assignment of their respective interests, are tenants
in common of the estate: Id.
A creditor levied an execution on the estate of his debtor, and caused
the same to be set off to him in part satisfaction of his execution, sub-
ject to a family homestead. He subsequently brought a writ of entry
to recover the premises thus set off, and had judgment thereon fbr a
writ of possession, subject to the defendant's homestead of $500. Upon
petition by the creditor for partition, held, that the committee appointed
to make such partition should assign to the debtor, by metes and
bounds, so much of the estate as they might find to have been of the
value of $500 on the date of the completion of the levy thereon, not at
the time when partition is made: Id.
Titlc-Lease.-The benefits of the homestead law are not confined to
an ownership in fee, but attach to the house and lot in which the debtor
has such a term as may be sold on execution. The object of the statute
is to protect the owner and his family in a lome. free fron sale under
judgment or decree; and a tenant for years is as clearly within the reason
of' the statute, as the owner of a larger estate. The statute was designed
to protect estates liable to sale on execution or decree, and a term for
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years is such an estate. The owner of a term for years, is an owner to
that extent: Conklin v. Foster, 57 Ills.
The owner of a homestead, although a judgment-debtor, may sell
and convey his homestead, and the purchaser will take the title free
from any lien of the judgment, as property thus situated is not liable to
levy and sale, and no lien of a judgment attaches to it: Id.
A house erected upon ground held under a lease, is annexed to and
iorms a part of the leasehold estate. The house is not, of itself, a sepa-
rate chattel, but it, with the lease on the ground, forms a chattel real;
and not being naturally divisible, it is not regular for the officer to sever
the house from the term to which it is annexed: Id.
A sheriff has no power to levy on and sell houses, timber or orna-
mental trees, and sever them from the fee: Id.
Although a sale of the house, situated on leased ground, owned and
occupied as a homestead, under an execution, confers no title, still it
being a cloud on the title, equity will take jurisdiction to remove the
cloud, especially when the purchaser under the execution is in possession,
and threatens to remove the house, and thus commit waste: Id.
The court, having acquired jurisdiction for other purposes, will
proceed to do complete justice, and, in such case, give rents against
the purchaser under the execution, for the time the property was occu-
pied by him: Id.
INFANT.
When the Act of the Attorney of a Prochein Ami is binding on the
Infant.-An action was brought for and in the name of an infant, who
sued by prochein ami, and judgment having been recovered by the
plaintiff, the amount thereof was paid by the defendant to the attorney
of record, who was regularly employed by the prochein ami to conduct
the action ; and by order of the attorney the judgment was entered,
,,satisfied;" at the time of the payment to the attorney there was no
regularly constituted guardian of the beneficial plaintiff to receive and
receipt for the money recovered. Held, that the payment by the de-
fendant to the attorney of record was a good discharge of the judgment;
and his act in receiving the money and directing satisfaction of the
judgment to be entered, was binding upon the infant plaintiff: B. and
0.1R. R. Co. v. FUtzpatrick, 36 Md.
A prochein ami is no party to the suit in the technical sense of the
term, although he is responsible for costs. He is considered as an officer
of the court specially appointed to look after the interest of the infant in
whose behalf he acts; he may employ an attorney, and carry on the suit
to judgment, and in the absence of a regularly constituted guardian for
the infant, may receive the money recovered of the defendant, give a
sufficient acquittance therefor, and enter satisfaction on the roll : Id.
The right of a prochein ami, or of the attorney employed by him, to
receive and receipt for money recovered by an infant, is subordinate to
that of the regularly constituted guardian of the infant, and where such
guardian exists, only he, or some person deriving authority from him,
can legally receive and receipt for money due the ward: Id.
Section 14 of Article 18 of the Code of Public General Laws, author-
izing the clerk of any court to enter any judgment or decree satisfied,
upon the order in writing of the plaintiff, or his attorney, was not
designed to conclude or in any manner affect the question of the
VOL. XXI.-17
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attorney's authority to give such order; it was intended simply to direct
and empower the clerk, upon the proper order of the plaintiff or his
attorney, to enter judgments and decrees satisfied, without an order of
court: id.
INSURANCE.
Proofs of Loss- Waiver of Objections to.-Where the insured, within
the time limited, furnished the agent of the insured with the prelimei-
nary proofs of the loss, and they were received without objection to their
sufficiency, and objections to the payment of the loss were afterwards
put upon other grounds,-held, that the defects in the proofs must be
regarded as waived: Taylor v. The Roger Williams insurance Co., 51
N. 11.
l1i[d, also, that the waiver would extend to the ease where, instead
of the certificate of the nearest magistrate, as the rules required, a certi-
ficate of a reputable citizen, not a magistrate, was received and assented
to by the agent of the insurer as sufficient: Id.
The instructions to the jury, that if the assent to this certificate was
procured by the false representations of the insured there would be no
waiver, were correct: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Homestead; Payment.
Presumption of Exthguishment of Rent.-Where the relation of land-
lord and tenant has once been established, under a sealed lease, the mere
circumstance that the landlord has not demanded the rent cannot justify
the presumption that lie has extinguished the right to it, by a convey-
ance: Lyon, v. Adde, 
63 Barb.
Where premises were conveyed to the defendant by C., subject to the
rents then due and to become due to S. V. R1. and his heirs and assigns;
Held, that by receiving his title subject to these rents, the defendant was
estopped from denying that they were then subsisting liens upon the
premises, and that the covenants to pay them were then in force : Id.
But that if that were not so, there was at least an explicit admission,
in writing. by 0.. his grantor, of the subsistence of the covenant ; and
that, by all the authorities, was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
extinguishment, even as against a presumption of law: Id.
LICENSE.
Effect of-Rcvocability.-A license to do certain acts upon land does
not convey any interest in the land; it amnounts to nothing more than
an excuse for acts which would otherwise be trespasses : Blaisdell v. G.
. and C. R. R., 51 N. II.
Any license pertaining to land may be revoked, so far as it is not ex-
ecuted; otherwise, a mere license might operate to convey an interest
in land: Id.
A license to build a railroad upon one's land would excuse any
acts properly done under the license while the same was in force, but
such license might be revoked at pleasure, as to everything in the
future: id.
Possession held under a license cannot be adverse: Id.
The decease of either party to such a license, or the conveyance by
either of the rights affected by the license, operates as a revocation : Id
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MECHANIC'S LIEN. See Hortgage.
MORTGAGE.
Mortgage for future Advances-Article 64, section 2 of the Code-
When a MAfortgage has Priority over a .echanics' Lien- What constitutes
the Commencement of a Building under the iMechanics' Lien Law.-
Where the amount intended to be secured is expressed in the mortgage,
as required by the Code (art. 64, see. 2), it is valid, though designed to
secure future advances to that extent: Brooks v. Lester, 36 Md.
A mortgage to secure the payment of a specified sum of money for
building materials to that amount in value, to be furnished from time to
time, as required by the mortgagor, is valid. The fact that the advances
are to be made in materials in lieu of money, does not affect the validity
of the instrument: Id.
In order to give a mortgage to secure advances priority over a me-
chanics' lien, the mortgage must be recorded before the building is
commenced: d.
The commencement of a building under the mechanics' lien law is
the first labor done on the ground which is made the foundation of the
building, and is to form part of the work suitable and necessary for its
construction : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Action for Damages- Ordinary Care and Prudence-Proximat
Cause- Want of due Care and Caution.-Where a person walking on
a railroad-track is run over and killed by an engine belonging to the
railroad company, the company is responsible in damages for such kill-
ing, though the deceased was guilty of a want of ordinary care and pru-
dence in so walking on the track, provided it appear that the accident
would not have occurred if the agents of the railroad company had used
in running the engine which occasioned the killing, ordinary prudence
and care in giving reasonable and usual signals of its approach, and in
keeping a reasonable look-out: B. & 0. Railroad v. State, Use of Dough-
erty, 36 Md.
In considering the question of ordinary care and prudence on the
part of a person killed by being run over on a railroad-track, the jury
have a right to take into consideration, together with the other facts of
the case, the known and ordinary disposition of men to guard them-
selves against danger: Id.
Where a person walking on a railroad-track is run over by an engine
belonging to the railroad company and operated by its agents, and in
consequence of the injury thus received, dies shortly afterward, an
action for damages for the use of his widow and children, is maintain-
able against the railroad company, if it appear that there was negligence
on the part of its agents, which was the proximate and immediate cause
of the injury, notwithstanding the deceased may have been guilty of a
want of ordinary care and prudence, tending in a remote degree to cause
the injury which resulted in his death: Id.
A person walking on a railroad-track, away from any public crossing,
was told by his companion, who heard the noise, that an engine was
coming, and he replied, "I seen a train running up and down the other
track this evening," and was immediately run over by the approaching
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engine, and died in consequence of the injury which he received. In
an action against the railroad company by the state, in behalf of the
widow and children of the deceased, it was held, That if the deceased
at the time he received the warning from his companion, could have left
the railroad-track, and under all the circumstances and surroundings of
his situation had sufficient time to do so, and would by doing so have
escaped injury, then his remaining upon the track of the railroad after
such warning, was such a want of due care and caution on his part as
to debar the equitable plaintiffs from recovery, though there was negli-
gence on the part of the defendant's agents: Id.
NUISANCE.
Liability1 for.-The liability for a nuisance is not restricted to per-
sons who occasion the whole of it; but those who are guilty of doing but
a part are liable also, if they do it with like intent: The Chenanyo
Bridge Co. v. Lewis et al., Ex'rs, &c., 63 Barb.
Thus, where the nuisance is not the structure, but the illegal 'use of
it, the liability attaches not only to those who are engaged in the use,
but also to those who erected the structure -with the knowledge, or the
intent, that it should be put to the illegal use. And the liability of the
builder is precisely the same as if he had been the employer, instead of
the employee : Id.
It is the general rule that the creator of a nuisance is liable for its
continuance. To this rule there is an exception, where he is not in
possession of the premises, which are occupied by other persons claim-
ing them as their own, and not holding as his tenants : Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Troluntary Dissolution-Liability of Partners for Notes execated or
endorsed by one of the Partners in the name of the Firm.-B., a member
of the firm of B. & T., engaged in the millin business, was in the habit
of issuing and negotiating commercial paper in the name of the firm.
for the purpose of raising money for the use of the firm, which paper
was discounted by the bank of H., in its regular course of business. A
voluntary dissolution of the firm took place, of which no notice was
published, and of' which the bank had no actual knowledge. The bank
continued to deal with B. on account of the firm, and after its dissolu-
tion discounted two notes drawn or endorsed by B. in the firm-name. B.
died, and judgments on the notes were confessed by an attorney in favor
of the bank against T., the surviving partner. Executions were issued
on the judgments and levied on the property of T. A bill was filed by
T. to rc-train the further execution of the writs of fieri ]hcias, upon
the grounds, among others, that the notes upon which the judgments
were entered were drawn by B. after the dissolution of the firm, and
negotiated by him for his private use and benefit; and kurther, that the
suits on the notes were docketed, and judgments confessed thercon,
without his authority or knowledge : ld. That the complainant was
not entitled to the relief prayed, as no meritorious ground of defence
was disclosed by the bill : T ylor v. JIll, 36 Md.
Notes executed or endorsed by one partner in the name of the firm,
after a dissolution of the 1'a1Lership, of which no notice was published,
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are binding on the other partners, in the hands of strangers who re-
ceived them for value, in the regular course of business, without actual
knowledge of the dissolution: Id.
PAYMENT. See Bils and Notes.
Presumption of.-In the case of an obligation which can be extin.
guished by an act in yais-such as payment-there is an absolute
presumption of payment, after the lapse of twenty years. It is a pre-
sumption of law, and can be rebutted only by some positive act of
unequivocal recognition, like part payment, or a written admission, or
at least a clear and well identified verbal promise or admission, intelli-
gently made, within the period of twenty years: Lyon v. Adde, 63 Barb.
There is also another presumption-a presumption of fact, or more
properly, in the nature of evidence which can be drawn by a jury from
the circumstances of the case, in less than twenty years : Id.
But where the obligation can be extinguished only by deed, the rule
is different. In that case, there is no presumption of law at all; but
there is the same presumption in the nature of evidence, as in the other
cases: Id.
It is a presumption to be drawn from all the circumstances of the
case; but mere length of time, by itself, will never raise it. That one
circumstance, of itself, is insufficient ; but it is a circumstance from
which, in connection with other circumstances, the satisfaction of the
obligation may be found by a jury, or decreed by a court of chancery: rd.
Where a lease creates the relation of landlord and tenant, and the
grantor's interest is an hereditament, descendible and hereditable, any
release of the rent must be by deed; and there can be no presumption
of payment, arising from lapse of time: Id.
Courts can draw no conclusion of law from the lapse of time during
which rent has remained unpaid; but any presumption which they may
raise must be drawn from all the facts and circumstances of the case as
evidence, in the same manner in which a jury would draw inferences of
fact: Id.
PWADING. See Venue.
Allegations and Proofs-Where it was averred in the declaration that
the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff five per cent. on the amount for
which he should sell a mill of defendant, whatever it might amount to,
is not sustained by evidence that defendant agreed to pay plaintiff five
per cent. if he would sell the mill for five thousand dollars. In this
there is a fatal variance between the contract declared upon and that
proved: Meifee v. Higgins, 57 Ills.
Common Counts-Proof under.-Where a common count alleged an
indebtedness of five hundred dollars for commissions on the sale of land
and mill, such a count is not sustained by evidence of an exchange of
the mill and land for other property. Had the special agreement been
fully performed, and had nothing remained to be done but to pay the
money due on the agreement, then a recovery might have been had
under the common count, but plaintiff having failed to. perform hi
part of the agreement, he cannot recover : Id.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
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SALE. See Warranty.
Contract for Goods or for Labor in making them-Distinction between
-Statute of Frauds -Where the contract is for an article coming under
the general denomination of goods, wares or merchandise, the quantityrequired and the price being agreed upon, it is a contract of sale within
the Statute of Frauds, although the subject-matter, at the time of
making the contract, does not exist in goods, but is to be converted into
that state subsequently b5 the maker and vendor; but if what is con-
templated by the agreement is the peculiar skill, labor or care of the
maker, then the contract is one for work and labor, and not within the
statute : Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H.
An article sold is at the risk of the buyer as soon as the contract of
sale is perfected. If the sale is of things which consist in quantity,
and which are sold by number, weight or measure, the sale is not per-
fect until the thing bargained for is counted, weighed or measured, for
until that time it is not apparent which are the goods that make the
object of the sale; but the contract relates only to an object which is
indeterminate, and which can be determined only by the measuring
weighing or counting, and the risk cannot fall but upon some determin-
ate thing: Rd.
This rule holds, not only when the sale is of a certain quantity to be
taken from a larger bulk, but also when the sale is of the entire quan-
tity, provided it is made at the rate of so much the pound, measure or
number; for the price being constituted only for each pound which
shall be weighed, or for each number (as each hundred or thousand)
which shall be measured, is not determined before the weighing or
measuring: Id.
Both the delivery and acceptance of the thing sold must be unequivo-
cal, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and
place the thing sold at the risk of the buyer: Id.
To constitute delivery so that the property bargained for will pass,
nothing must remain to be done concerning it by either party : Md.
Where the existence of a contract is to be determined by the ascer-
tainment of the mutual understanding of the parties, evidence of the
independent understanding of each and every party to the contract is
admissible : Id.
SLANDER.
Pleading and Evidcnce.-In an action of slander, for charging the
plaintiff with having committed fornication, and the plea of justification
averred that plaintiff had been guilty of fornication, without averring
any time, it was error in the court to restrict the proof (f' her having
committed fornication to two years before the words were spoken by
defendant. The plea not being limited as to time, the proof should not
have been. Proof of the truth of the plea without reference to when
the act was committed, was pertinent to the issue, and should have been
admitted : Stowdl v. Buqle, 57 Ills.
It was improper to admit evidence of the fact that there was a prier
personal difficulty between defendant and the father of plaintiff. as it did
not tend to prove actual malice against the plaintiff, and was not per-
tinent to the issue : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Where the plea of justification set up the fact that the plaintiff had
been guilty of fornication, it was error to instruct the jury that to main-
tain the plea the defendant must prove the words charged were true, on
the grounds that plaintiff, although an unmarried woman, was guilty of
fornication, and had been delivered of a child, and it was necessary
that such alleged facts, constituting the justification, should be proved
by clear and satisfactory evidence, and if not so proved, the defence
would fail. Nothing being in the plea in regard to the plaintiff's having
been delivered of a child, the instruction was too broad, and should not
have been given. Such an instruction was well calculated to mislead
the jury: Id.
STATUTES.
Retrospective-- When Valid.--Retrospective statutes are not forbidden
by the Constitution, in cases in which they do not impair the obligation
of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws; and such
statutes may be made, by express language, to have that effect. Yet,
unless they are so expressed, by necessary implication they will be
interpreted otherwise, and so that they shall not operate to change the
existing state of things, or the common law : The People ev t. Pitt v.
The Board of Supervisors of Ulster County, 63 Barb.
The only exception to this rule is, that the doctrine does not apply to
remedial statutes; which may be of a retrospective nature, provided
they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested rights, and only
go to confirm rights already existing, and are in furtherance of the
remedy and add to the means of enforcing existing obligations: Id.
What Statutes have a Retrospective Effect.-By an act of the legisla-
ture, passed in April 1871, the board of supervisors of any county in
the state (except New York and Kings) were authorized, by a two-thirds
vote, to legalize the irregular acts of any town officer, performed in good
faith and within the scope of his authority; provided such legalization
should be recommended by the county court; and to correct any mani-
fest clerical or other error in any assessments or returns made by any
town officer to such board of supervisors, &c. A county judge, assum-
ing to act under this statute, recommended that the taxes which had
been assessed against the relator for the years 1866, 1867 and 1868, be
refunded to her, and made an order to that effect. The board of super-
visors refused to refund or allow such taxes. Held, that the statute in
question was to be deemed prospective only; and did not have a retro.
active effect, so as to include taxes assessed prior to its passage: Id.
TOWN. See Highway.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Forfeiture of Contract-Delay in Performane-Fraud-Defective
Title-Specific Performane.-Although a contract for the sale of land
reserves the right to declare it forfeited, and the right to retain the
money already paid on the purchase in case the vendee fails to make
prompt payment as the several instalments of the purchase-money fall
due, still the vendor cannot declare such a forfeiture where the land thus
sold is encumbered, and he is unable to perform his part of his contract,
by conveying a clear and perfect title according to the agreement:
Wallace v. XcLaughlin, 57 Ills.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Where the vendor has the reserved power of declaring a forfeiture, he
cannot do so, unless he is in a position, at the time, to compel a specific
performance of the agreement : Id.
Upon bill filed by purchaser of land, to restrain a vendor from recover-
ing land sold, and to be conveyed free from encumbrance, into the pos-
-session of which the purchaser had entered under the agreement, such
relief will not be barred by his failure to make payments, by reason of
the encumbrance on the land: Id.
Where a vendor falsely represents that his title is good and free from
encumbrance, and thus induces the purchaser to forego an examination
of the title, and the purchaser enters and makes payments and large
improvements on the land before he learns of the encumbrances, and
then refuses to make further payments on the purchase until the encum-
brances are removed, he cannot be held to be in default in making pay-
ments : l.
After the vendor has declared a forfeiture, and recovered in eject-
ment, the vendee may, notwithstanding the encumbrance, tender the
balance of the purchase-money, waive his right to insist upon a perfect
title, and compel a specific performance of the agreement. It would be
inequitable to permit the vendor to retain the money paid, to get the
land with the valuable improvements placed thereon by the purchaser,
and escape the payment of the taxes while occupied by the purchaser,
and give the purchaser nothing but the use of the land. In such a case,
it is equitable to decree that the purchaser pay the balance of the price
agreed to be paid for the land, less the amount of the encumbrance, and
to require the vendor to execute a deed with the covenants stipulated
for in the agreement : Id.
VENUE.
Where to be laid after Clange of.-Where a suit is instituted in one
county and removed to another, and the declaration is amended, the
venue should be laid as of the county in which the suit was instituted
CGunty Commissioners v. Gibson, 36 Md.
WARRANTY.
Evidence to Prove.-The general rule is, that the representations or
affirmnations constituting a warranty, or the representations which are
charged to be false, must be made during the negotiations for the sale
Shl v. Ostrander, 63 Barb.
A warranty must be made during the treaty, or at the time of the
sale, or at least before the performance of the substantial terms thereof:
Id.
After an agreement for an exchange of horses had been made between
the parties. and consummated by a delivery, the plaintiff returned the
horse lie had received, and after rescinding the first agreement, a new
bargain was made, by which the defendant sold his horse to the plaintiff
for $100. ield, that the representations and wayranties made by the
dtlndaut on the first bargain, did not enter into and form a part of the
second, so as to constitute a defence to an action for fraud or breach of
warranty : -M.
